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The agrarian crisis of  the late nineteenth century has receiwd considerable 
anention from Spanish historians. Whereas agricultural historians haw concentrated on the 
negatiw effects of lost markets and reduced farm profitability because of foreign 
competition. economic historians haw been more concerned \\·ith the costs associated \\ith 
the state' s response to lo\\·er farn1 prices. namely tariff protection. In a recent paper. I argued 
that the impact of  cereal tariffs on agricultural performance has been exaggerated. especially 
between 1902/12 and 1930/5.  I  Here I propose to look in greater detail at the nature of  the 
agrarian crisis, and consider whether tariffs were the only solution possible in the period prior 
to the First World War.  In the first section I examine to what extent historians have been 
right in labeling the difficulties facing agriculture at the end of the nineteenth century as a 
"crisis", as oppose to just a cyclical dm\nturn in agricultural prices.  I argue that the extent of 
the crisis has often been exaggerated.  The impact of  the productivity increases in New World 
agriculture and the transport revolution affected agriculture in all European countries, but in 
Spain there were fewer changes that in other western European countries, with the exception 
of  Portugal, and possibly Italy.  The second section looks at the regional and sectorial 
problems facing farmers in the period, and to what extent adequate solutions were found. 
Government policies, together with weak internal demand,  permined resources to be kept in 
the traditional sectors of  cereals, vines and olives. Although fam1 output increased, labour 
productivity in the sector did linle more than stagnate benveen 1880 and 1910.  In the final 
section I argue that the real solution to raising productivity on the secano was labour saving 
mechanisation.  However, this was a solution which was rejected by most contemporaries, 
who still believed a successful and prosperous agriCUlture needed to absorb, rather than shed, 
labour. Given the difficulties in accepting mechanisation as a solution, the state might have 
been expected to have tried to mobilize resources to provide alternatives, especially in the 
area of  labour intensive family fanning. Yet prior to the 1910 the state's role was small. 
Finally, on the demand side, the lack of  structural change and slow urban growth provided 
few incentives for fam1ers to diversify their production. Only around the First World War 
were there significant changes, as labour started leaving the land in large numbers 
I Simpson. 1997. 
2 encouraging mechanisation: rising per capita incomes and growing cities stimulated product 
specialization. and the state became more actiw in the provision of  public goods. Rising 
wage costs no\\' encouraged wider technological change.  But the agrarian crisis between 
about 1880 and 1910. \\'hilst a stimulus to change in other countries. tended to consolidate 
traditional agricultural production systems in Spain. 
1. The agrarian crisis in an European context. 
The lack of  reliable production figures before about 1900 makes it necessary 
to consider indirectly trends in agriculture.  In this section I look at five areas where Spanish 
agriculture differed from the general western European experience over the half century prior 
to the First World War, namely (a) wheat prices (which fell less than most countries), (b) 
wages (which rose less), (c) land rents (increased more), (d) emigration (less) and (e) 
livestock specialization (less).  The evidence suggests that the international price shocks had 
a relatively small direct impact on Spanish agriculture compared to northern Europe.  In this 
respect, Spain appears more like PortugaL where Reis has argued that "la crisis agraria fue .. , 
un proceso defensivo conservador, mas que un proceso transfonnador".2  Although most 
farmers did respond to market changes, and some successfully changed farming methods 
prior to 1910,  these were not sufficient to reduce. (a) the two thirds of  the active population 
who were still employed in the sector in 1910, (b) change the relative importance of  the 
secano. which was little different from what it had been in the mid nineteenth century or (c), 
farming methods which were still essentially traditional. 
Falling transport costs and productivity growth in New World agriculture 
caused big falls in European farm prices.  Three price series for Spain are shovm in Graph 1, 
namely the national wheat price, Ballesteros' cost of  living estimate for food, and Prados de la 
Escosura's fann price series.  Because of  the importance of  wheat in all these series, it is not 
surprising that trends are similar.  However, the larger basket of  goods found in the price 
series of  Ballesteros and Prados de la Escosura produce noticeably less volatility, than when 
just the wheat series is used.
3 In particular, when the wheat index falls from 123 in 1882 to 91 
2  Reis. 1988. p.328. 
J  See also Simpson. 1992. pp.112-t, 
3 in 1884, the decline in Ballesteros' index is from 119 and 103, and  Prados de la Escosura's 
index, from  114 to 107. Like\\1se, the low point in the wheat index is  1895 ("v'hen prices fell 
to 80), compared to 93  for Ballesteros (in 1895) and 86 (in 1894) for Prados de la Escosura. 
Falling prices in the late nineteenth century are less if a broad basket of commodities is 
considered. rather than simply wheat. 
But wheat was important.  ;...'ot only did the international wheat price fall more 
than most other agricultural commodities because of productivity grO\\1h in New World 
agriculture, it was the most important agricultural commodity in most European countries, 
occupying a significant part of the arable. In Spain, cereals occupied 55 per cent of the SO\\TI 
arable in 1891-5, of  which 55 per cent was wheat.~ GEHR shows wheat prices falling by 
almost 13 per cent between 1874/84 and 1885/95, \\1th the falls being the most intense in the 
periphery, especially Catalufta, Galicia, Andalucia and Murcia, which often imported part of 
their requirements from other regions, or from overseas (columns 1-3, Table 1).5  But Graph 2 
suggests that Spanish prices fell less than elsewhere. Spanish prices moved upwards until 
1882, when they are 26 per cent above the base level of 1869172.  By contrast, the three other 
countries peaked a decade earlier (France in 1871, England in 1873, and Italy in 1874).  The 
drop in Spanish prices between 1882 and 1884 was 26 per cent, compared to only 21  per cent 
in England, 17 per cent in France and 15 per cent in Italy.  However, from each country's 
respective peaks, the 1884 price level was 40 per cent lower in England and Italy, 32 per cent 
in France, and 26 per cent in Spain.  Therefore although wheat prices fell more suddenly in 
Spain in the early 1880s than elsewhere, when the longer period bet\veen 1871/84 is taken, 
the fall is less. After 1890 the combination of  tariff protection and devaluation of  the peseta 
stabilized prices at higher levels than in most European countries.
6  Therefore Spain suffered 
less from the late nineteenth century price shocks affecting cereals than in most western 
European countries. 
A second major difference was the behaviour of  wages (Table 2, column 1). 
Here the evidence is more controversial, as only one series has been used for Spain, namely 
building workers in Madrid, whose wage, in nominal terms, rose by about 20 per cent. 
'GEHR, 1983. p.243. 
5 GEHR, 1980. pp.23-4. 
6  See especially. PalafOlL  1991.  pp.35~. 
4 Evidence from mining and textile workers suggest the figure may have been nearer 30 per 
cent. HoweYer, even if  we accept a faster gro\\1h in Spanish real wages than that sho\\TI in 
Table 2. the gap \\'ith most other European countries remains significant. 
Spain also differed because not only did land rents increase O\'er the period. 
they also increased relatiw to wages (column 2. Table 2).~  The agricultural rental series for 
Spain are again weak. being based on Robledo (198-n and Camlona (1991).  S Robledo's 
sanlple shows that the only period when more than half of new rental contracts declined by 
more than 10 per cent was 188115; by  189115. only 10 per cent of new contracts showed a 
decline, compared to 74 per cent that increased.
9 More recently, Perez Picazo gi\'es a rental 
increase of 39 per cent between 1867 and 1902 in the huerta in Murcia, \\ith gro\\lh being 
registered at all fiYe bench marks used (1867, 1875, 1885, 1895 and 1902.10  By contrast, in 
Catalufia from the turn of  the century, Saguer's index shows at best only a modest recovery, 
in rents.'  I  Elsewhere, land prices were 42 per cent lower in Great Britain in 1912 than they 
had been in 1877, 19 per cent lower in Sweden, 15 per cent lower in France, but 8 per cent 
higher in Germany and 11  per cent higher in Denmark.
12  Local rent movements were 
obviously influenced by a wide variety of factors.  For example, higher tariffs, or a switch of 
resources from low yield wheat to high value fruit crops might allow landlords to increased 
rents at a time of  falling cereal prices.  However rising rents, especially on cereal land in 
Castilla-Le6n, are incompatible with the existence of  a sever and long agrarian crisis. 
Despite the weakness of  the sources, the general conclusions in Table 2 cannot 
be rejected:  factor price movements were very different in Spain to those in England, France, 
and Scandinavian.  Furthermore this information on factor and product prices suggests that 
not only did Spain escape relatively unscathed from the "crisis agraria", but there was little 
need for farmers to change production methods. This point is reinforced by Table 3, which 
shows the low share of  net migration, and the fact that two thirds of  labour was still found in 
agriculture in 1910. Sanchez Alonso shows that net emigration was only about 185,000 
7 Note. however. that there is no infonnation given for either Portugal or Italy, two countries which might ha\'e had a similar experience to 
that of  Spain. 
I  See O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, 1996. pp.522-4 for a list of  sources used. 
• Robledo, 1984, cuadro 18. 
'0 Perez Picazo, 1991, cuadro 4. 
11  Saguer, 1998. 
12  O'Rourke, 1997, Table 5. 
5 during the whole period between 1882 and 1904,  and Perez Moreda and Tortella haye noted. 
the pull from Spanish cities remained weak prior to  1914.1} Therefore the eyidence that the 
"crisis agraria" set off a rural exodus of any consequence is limited. This is important because 
Ireland. for example. a country which was sewrely affected by the price shocks of these 
years. probably saw agricultural output gro\\" at a slower rate than in Spain between 187.3-
1914. but labour productiyity increased because of the outt1O\\" of labour. P  \\'e shall return to 
this option later. 
The final difference between Spain and most countries was the response of 
farmers to the crisis.
15  Urbanisation, rising nominal wages and falling bread prices, all 
increased the demand for meat and dairy produces, leading to a significant grov.th in 
livestock farming in northern Europe during the forty years before the First World War.  Thus 
in Great Britain the area devoted to wheat fell by a half, and cattle increased by 30 per cent 
between 1870 and 1910. In France, whilst the value of  cereals stagnated, the output of  meat 
and dairy produce increased by 48 per cent between 1865/74 and 1905114. In Italy, cattle 
increased by 40 per cent between 1880 and 1910, and there were significant increases in the 
numbers of  pigs, sheep and goats.  If in Germany there was no fall in the area of wheat and 
rye, cattle numbers rose by a third between 1873 and 1913. In Spain the situation is harder to 
establish on account of the lack of  reliable censuses, but the size of  the national herd was not 
so very different in 1865, as it was in 1917, or indeed 1929.  By contrast, the area of  wheat 
grew throughout most of  the nineteenth century, and increased by 24 per cent, and production 
by 34 per cent, between 1905/9 and 1930/4.
16 
By 1910, livestock products represented 72 per cent of  final agricultural 
output in the United Kingdom, 44 per cent in France, but just 30 per cent in Spain and 28 per 
cent in Italy.17  Of  course, there was no reason why Spain should have moved resources into 
livestock  -even if  we assumed that natural resources were favourable- if  fanners found other 
activities more profitable.  However, and as we shall see in Section 3, low agricultural 
productivity in Spain was caused by the fact that so many resources were devoted to 
13 Sanchez Alonso. 1995, Cuadro AJ.6; Perez Moreda, 1985, p.58 and Tortella. 1985, p.72. 
I. Turner,  1996,  chs.4 and 6,  and Guinanne, 1997, p.39. 
"  Sources for this section are cited in Simpson. 1997, p. 77. 
"  Official wheat production figures for the  18905 appear to be under-estimated.  Sanz.,  1981, p.325 and Simpson, 1989. pp.359-Q1. 
PO'  Brien and Prados de la Escosura.  1992. 
6 traditional crops. 
In conclusion, although some of  the information assembled in this section is 
somewhat fragile. the impact of  the agrarian crisis appears to have been less. and therefore 
agriculture had to undergo considerably fewer changes in Spain than the other countries. \\-ith 
the possible exceptions of Portugal or Italy. Not only \\-ere the supply side changes \\hich the 
agrarian crisis encouraged elsewhere weaker in Spain. but so too were the demand side 
changes.  As a result, Spanish agriculture performed poorly in the period 1880-1910. GEHR 
suggests that labour productivity fell by 10 per cent and Simpson, by 3 per cent, bet\\-een 
189115 and 1910.
18  Prados de la Escosura's index of  output. by contrast. is slightly more 
optimistic and shows a 5 per cent gro\\1h between the same dates, or 12 per cent over the 
longer period, 1875/9 - 1909/13.
19  This slow gro\\1h was caused by structural problems, 
rather then the crisis itself. 
2. A closer look at the difficulties facing Spanish farmers between 1880-1914. 
As in other European countries, it has been argued that the crisis affected 
some Spanish regions, and some commodities, more than others.  This is not the moment to 
undertake an exhaustive study of the crisis, but rather to outline the major problems facing 
farmers during the period, and how they responded to the changes.  In the first instance, I 
provide a very general picture of  how contemporaries themseh'es interpreted the regional 
dimension of  the crisis, and then look briefly at three sectors, namely wheat, \\ine and olive 
oil. In the final section I take a more critical look at the implications of  government policy. 
As we have seen, wheat (and barley) prices peaked in the early 1880s,  \\ine 
prices started falling from the late 1880s (although the long run price series remained strong 
until the 1890s), and olive oil prices were weak from the early 1870s.  The major source for 
understanding the "crisis" is the seven volume Crisis agricola y pecuari~ published between 
1887 and 1889.  A very rough idea of  the regional intensity of  the problems can be seen in 
Table 1, columns 5 and 6. Volumes two to five of Crisis agricola v pecuaria consist of 
written replies by individuals and institutions from throughout Spain to 130 questions. All 
11  GEHR, 1983, cuadro 15 and Simpson, 1994. p.52_ 
,.  Prados de la Escosura. 1995, p_85_ 
7 replies seem to have been published. The Interior (the two Castillas. Extremadura. the Ebro 
Valley and Aragan) accounted for 62 per cent of replies (Table L column 5). against 61  per 
cent of the agricultural area and -+ 1 per cent of  the agricultural output in  1909113: in 
Andalucia the number of replies numbered  1-+  per cent (20 per cent of the area. and 20 per 
cent of output):  the North (Galicia and Cantabria) 13  per cent of replies (9 per cent of area 
and 17 per cent of output) and. finally. the l'.lediterranean (Cataluna. Levante. l'.lurcia and 
Baleares). 11  per cent of replies (13 per cent of the area and 22 per cent of output).  The last 
column of Table 1 anempts to separate out those who believed that there was a crisis, and 
those who did not.  I include all those who replied  "yes" to question 23  ((,Existe la crisis 
agricola?), and all those who I take to believe implied from their report that there was a 
crisis.
cO  The geographical distribution is very similar, \\ith the Interior providing 61  per cent 
of  those \vho believed that there was a crisis, against 16 per cent in Andalucia, 13 per cent in 
the North and 11  per cent in the Mediterranean. Although there were few people who 
specifically denied that there was an agrarian crisis, there \vas a \\ide variety of  definitions, 
and explanations of its causes.  However, in general, contemporaries seem to have believed 
that the problems were especially sever in the interior, notably on the secano. We shall now 
look at the main difficulties facing wheat, wine and olive oil producers, and consider whether 
tariffs were an effective remedy. 
The worst problems were believed to be found with cereal farmers on the 
secano, and these consisted of more than simply a decline in prices. As Table 1 shows, 
Spain's principal cereal producing region Castilla-Ia-Vieja and Lean saw wheat prices fall by 
only nine per cent between 1874/84 and 1885/95, which becomes a one per cent increase 
when the longer period, 1874/84-189611902 is considered.
21  GEHR argues that it was the 
combination of falling, or stagnant prices, and rising costs which threatened producers. They 
estimate that rents rose by 22 per cent and labour by 33 per cent between 1862/4 and 188517. 
Wheat prices kept pace with this increase until 1880/2 (a 21  per cent increase), but then fall 
20 There are three main reasons why this is necessary: (I) some individuals sent a general report, rather than replied to the questions: (2) 
others answered only one bloc of  questions, for example, those on wine, and therefore failed to answer question 23, and (3), some thought 
it was obvious from the narure of  their repon that there was a crisis, without ha\'ing to answer the question.  I exclude the technical repons 
from engineers etc., who did not repon directly on agriculture. 
21  GEHR..  1980. cuadro 4. 
8 strongly.22 This suggests that rents would also have fallen. but that this was avoided because 
of  tariffs (and a depreciating peseta), therefore benefiting lando\\11ers rather than tenants. 
A second point made by Jesus Sanz. and repeated by GEHR. is that wheat 
imports in the  1890s were detem1ined not just by domestic prices. but also by \yhat \\-as 
happening else\\-here. 23  For example. the poor Spanish han-est of 1891  did not attract 
significant imports, because prices rose e\-en more in England: in  189-1- by contrast. despite a 
reasonable han-est. Spain imported large quantities, because prices fell  e\-en more elsewhere 
in Europe. This indeed suggests a fundan1ental change in the market. as the Spanish wheat 
price was increasingly being determined not just by domestic conditions of supply and 
demand, but by \\  ider changes in the international economy. This was part of  a long term 
change in the nature of  prices. For much of  the nineteenth century, farmers were compensated 
after poor harvests by high prices, while good harvests led to falling prices. This produced 
significant price instability for consumers, but stability for farmers. By contrast, the twentieth 
century saw an increase in imports at times of  poor han'ests, reducing any tendency for prices 
to fall. Large harvest, when accompanied by protection, now implied high farm incomes, as 
the Banco de Bilbao noted in 1948 that "aii.o de buenas cosechas es aii.o de prosperidad para el 
comercio y las industrias transformadoras".  2~  Therefore, from the early 1880s, Spanish 
farmers no longer benefited automatically from high prices after a poor han'est, or Iow prices 
after a poor one.  Prices were becoming more stable for consumers, but at the expense of 
introducing great instability in farm incomes. 
The consequences of  these changes were felt most in Castilla-la-Vieja and 
Le6n, which in the period 1890/4 was responsible for 80 per cent of  the net movements of 
wheat and flour between Spanish regions, and which on average sold 45 per cent of  its 
harvest outside the area As can be seen in Table 4, "exports"  to other regions were totally 
unrelated with the size of  the local harvest, and resulted in stocks for local consumption 
fluctuating widely from the equivalent of  84 kilos/head in 1891, to 239 kilos/head in 1894 .25 
The problems facing Spanish farmers before 1914, and especially those of  the 
21 GEHR, 1988, p_50_ Prices from  Sanchez-AlbomoL 1975, pp_162-5. where.! take an average for Burgos, Palencia and Valladolid_ 
Wheat prices between 186214 - 1885n increased by 3 per cent 
2J Sanz, 1985_ 
2.  Cited in Leal, etal_, 1977, pp_17-8_  By contrast in the early years of the nineteenth centul)-. after the plentiful han-est in Palencia in 
1806, prices collapsed and wheat was used to feed the pigs_  Lopez y Peila!yer, 1812_ 
9 interior, were rising costs and increased income instability, rather than simply the absolute 
level of wheat prices. The increase in protection offered farmers more time to adapt to the 
new situation. with the depreciation of  the peseta being more important than tariffs prior to 
the early t\yentieth century.26 Looked at from another angle. goyemment policies were 
increasingly effectiw in making the country self-sufticient: whereas in  1890/9 Spain 
imported 7.6 per cent of its wheat requirements. in  1900,'9 the tigure was 7.3 per cent. in 
1910/9.5.6 per cent. and in 1920/9,4.0 per cent.
2
- As self-sufticiency in wheat was an 
important goal for many contemporaries. this might be considered a success. HoweWL and as 
I have argued elsewhere. the period 1880-1930 is one of  two very different stories.
28  In the 
first half, and until about 1905,  there \vere few changes in the area SO\\TI, little mechanization 
or use of  artificial fertilizers, and the rural exodus had hardly started; in the second half, 
artificial fertilizers contributed to a significant increase in the area of  wheat (but yields hardly 
shifted), labour started leaving the land in large numbers, and farmers mechanized in growing 
numbers. Rather than to look for changes in the level of  protection as the key to these two 
stories, the answer would seem to be rising urban wages changing nature of  demand for 
agricultural produce (per capita wheat consumption peaks in about 1918/22), and drawing 
labour from the countryside.  Any advantage in achieving growing self-sufficiency in cereals 
between about 1885 and 1905 was insignificant compared to the impact on welfare caused by 
the slo\'.: grO\\1h of  the economy, and agriculture in particular.  Although certainly not of  the 
same scale as the 1930s and 1940s, the 1\\'0 decades be1\veen about 1885 and 1905 appear as a 
period when Spanish agriculture grew at a significantly lower rate than other major countries. 
Wine differs from most commodities in the 1870s and 1880s because, far 
from being years of "crisis", they were a "golden age" for producers. Prices weakened slightly 
from the second half of  the 1880s, but exports continued increasing until 1891. Thereafter 
Spanish growers faced three problems:  weak wine prices, product adulteration and 
phylloxera The area of  vines declined from its peak of  almost 2 million hectares in the mid 
1880s to 1.24 million in 1914, before recovering slightly.  Although they arrived late, the 
25 Sanz, 1985, cuadro 19. 
26 GEHR, 1980, cuadro 14. See also Sanchez Alonso, 1995, and forthcoming. 
"GEHR, 1980, cuadro 17. and Carreras (ed.l. 1989.  pp.l08 and 113-4. 
21 Simpson. 1997, pp.79-83. 
10 problems facing the domestic wine producers were more complicated than those found in 
other sectors. They were also problems which required a response from the state which 
extended further than just tariffs on imported alcohol. Growers needed infomlation on what 
ne\y \'ines were most appropriate for their land. instructions on the techniques of grafting and 
the requirements of the new. post-phylIoxera yines. State agencies. growers' organizations 
and priYate enterprise (nurseries. etc.) helped pro\'ide solutions for indi\'idual growers. 
Although the recoyery in the area of yines was somewhat slow. despite the solution to 
phylloxera haying already been established in the Midi in the early 1880s. it is difficult to 
determine whether this was because of  weak action by the state, or the low wine prices facing 
growers.  Weak prices also created problems for farmers \\1shing to use credit markets. 
Although tax concessions were extended to those farmers who uprooted their dying vines and 
replanted new ones, this did little to reduce the heavy planting costs and the four year wait 
before the vines became productive. Instead, vineyards seem to have been replanted using 
predominantly unpaid family labour: growers being either the o\\ners of  the land, or working 
it using some form of  sharecropping contract.  ~9  Certainly viticulture was not going to recover 
its glory of  the 1870s and 1880s, but it is interesting to note that most complaints of  growers 
were concerned with measures to increase the demand for \\1neS, rather than encouraging its 
supply.  In particular, growers demanded lower taxes (especially the consumos) and 
protection from artificial wines, made from industrial alcohol, an important source of 
government revenue.
30 
In the nineteenth century, most of  the olive oil exported was of  poor quality, 
and used for industrial purposes, such as lighting, as a raw material in the manufacture of 
soap, or as a lubricant for machinery.  The growth in exports during the nineteenth century 
was halted in the last quarter with the availability of  other cheaper and more efficient 
vegetable oils. Between 1880 and 1896 the domestic price of  olive oil fell by approximately 
20 per cent of  what it had been in 1861179, in part because of  the increase in the supply of 
substitutes, and in part because of  the maturing of  olive trees planted in earlier periods.
31 
The recovery of  olive oil production is usually considered as a success story. 
29 For sharecropping outside Catalui'la. see, for example, Piqueras,  1981, Sabio,  1995, pp.l74-80 and 219-20 and  Carmona. fonhcoming, 
)0 See Pan-Montojo, 1994, pp,278-307, 
31  For 01 ive oil prices, see GEHR,  1981. 
11 Tariffs could protect Spanish olive oil producers from cheap imports of substitutes, but they 
obviously could not protect export markets.  Two major problems faced producers if they 
were to compete in international markets. namely product quality. and the de\elopment of 
new marketing networks.  With respect to production. the challenge lay not so much in the 
growing of olives. but rather in the manufacture of oil.  Although agronomists of the period 
frequently criticized grO\\'ers for using "traditional" techniques of production. and especially 
their choice of labour contracts for harvesting. which pro\'ided incentives for speed of 
collection, rather than in its care (harvesting by beating the trees - vareo. and paying by piece 
work destajo), growers showed themselves responsive to introducing improvements when 
there was a sufficient price premium. The real challenge lay in the processing of  the fruit, 
which required a substantial increase in fixed capital, and the introduction of new 
technologies. Not only did the area of  olives increase, but there was a rapid introduction of 
hydraulic presses and refining from the early twentieth century.32  There was less success in 
the marketing of  olive oil. Although exports grew over the half century prior to the Civil War, 
over two thirds in the period 1926-35 was still exported in bulk, most of which was then 
blended \\1th other oils.  Spain appears to have been slow adopting brand names compared to 
France or Italy, or in establishing marketing networks." 
In the first two sections of  this paper, I have argued that the impact of the 
"crisis agraria" in Spain was relatively small.  This had two important consequences. First, 
farmers suffered less from lower farm prices than elsewhere. Second, the smaller decline in 
farm prices when combined with a slow grov.ing (domestic) market, implied that resources 
were slow to switch out of  traditional production.  We can therefore questioned whether the 
expression "crisis agraria" is the most appropriate to describe the late nineteenth century.  But 
if  this is true, why was a commission established to examine it, and why did most of  those 
who replied argue that there was a crisis? The commission was established, at least in part, 
because other countries such as England, France and  Italy also conducted large agricultural 
inquiries in the late 1870s and early 1880s.  J.I  However, these inquiries were more concerned 
32  Zambrana, 1987, pp.l41-51 and Simpson, 1985, pp.l62-82 and 1995, pp. 167-72. 
3J  For a discussion on this. see Ram6n Ram6n. forthcominl!. 
J.I  P.P., Report on the Royal Commission on the Depresse; Condition of  the Agricultural Interests. London. 1881-2: Enquete sur la 
situation de I'agriculture en France en 1879, Paris, 1879-80, 2 vols.; and Ani della Giunta per I'Inchiesta agraria suI le condizioni della 
12 with property arrangements and structural problems facing agricultural deyelopment, rather 
than problems for farmers trying to compete in a period of falling prices. B  ut they helped to 
set the context for the Spanish Inquiry and. once a forum for debate was established, it is not 
surprising that plenty of  people and institutions took adyantage of it to argue for the need for 
state interyention - and especially tax reductions. improyed infrastructure and. of course. 
tariff protection.  This is perhaps where most confusion arises. because whereas for some the 
Inquiry was considered an opportunity for rent seeking, for others it was an opportunity to 
present detailed arguments for agrarian dewlopment rather than the need to solye short-term 
"crisis" difficulties.  It is a consideration of what would ha\'e been an appropriate strategy for 
agrarian development which we shall now consider in the final section. 
3. Farm profitability, productivity growth and the role of the state, 1880-1910. 
I have argued that the performance of  Spanish agriCUlture over the period 1880/1910 
was poor, with labour productivity remaining stagnant.  This is not to say that farmers did not 
introduce changes. Agricultural historians have found significant eyidence of  farmers 
improving livestock breeds, extending irrigation systems, intensifying cropping rotations and 
increasing yields.
35  Yet these two very different visions of  agriculture are not incompatible. 
In the first instance, the weight of  "traditional agriculture"  still remained yery large in 
1909/13, with cereals, legumes, potatoes, wine and oliye oil accounting for 55 per cent of la 
producci6n final agraria. When livestock is included, then the figure increases to 84 per cent. 
Although livestock production perhaps was undergoing important changes for example in 
Cantabria, there were much fewer in Galicia or Asturias, and even less in the provinces of the 
Interior and Andalucia, except for the milking cows kept in urban shippens. Therefore much 
oflivestocks' contribution to final output must also be considered as "traditional". The more 
dynamic sectors such as oranges, represented just 1,9 per cent and sugar beet, 0,9 per cent. A 
very rough calculation suggests that the "dynamic" sectors were at most 26 per cent of 
agriCUlture in 19 I 0.
36  Cereals (and legumes) still accounted for 53 per cent of fmal 
c1asse agricola, Roma,  1880-6, 15 vols. 
35  To cite just a very small number of  the many recent works, see Dominguez and Puente 1997. Perez Picazo, 1997, Garrabou, et.aI.I995 
and Pujol, 1998. 
36 The -dynamic sector- is taken as including irrigated cereals and legumes, all frutaJes. hortaJizas, plantas industriales, together with 
13 agricultural output in Castilla la Vieja, 42 per cent in Aragon.  41  per cent in Castilla la 
Nueva  and Alta Ebro. 34 per cent in Extremadura and 33 per cent in Andalucia. and wheat 
yields nationally were only 0.82 tons per hectare between 1905 /14 on the secano. 
Second.  historians have sho\\'n that the initial impact of teclmological change on 
productivity gro\\1h is often small. For example. total factor producti\'ity in Britain grew 
annually at a maximum of only 0.1  per cent bet\wen 1760 and 1801. despite apparent rapid 
technolo2:ical chan2:e in a number of key industries. 3- More recentl v. economists have tried  ............  ..  .. 
to reconcile the revolution in computer technologies with relatively slow gro\\1h rates of TFP 
in the United States.  According to my calculations, labour productivity in Spanish 
agriculture grew by 56 per cent between 1909113 and 1929/33, of  which about half came 
from increased output, and half from a decline in the labour force.
38  Changes of  this 
magnitude could not have taken place without an important accumulation of knowledge of 
biological and mechanical technologies over the decades prior to 1910.  However, the fruits 
of  these changes were enjoyed only after 1910. 
This poor performance between 1880 and 1910 can only partly be blamed on the 
agricultural crisis. As we have seen, the impact of  falling commodity prices, caused by the 
growing productivity in agriculture in the New World. and declining international transport 
costs was muted in Spain, compared to northern Europe. In part this was because of  tariffs 
and a depreciating peseta, but it was also because Spain had low per capita incomes and cities 
remained small, limiting urban demand for agrarian products. Spanish farmers did not have 
the same incentives to shift resources into higher value crops or livestock as in northern 
Europe.
39  Natural resources also restricted the flexibility in switching between products in 
response to changes in factor and product prices. But the problem of  natural resources was 
significantly increased by the unwillingness of  contemporaries to contemplate mechanization. 
Furthermore, even if  mechanization was rejected there were a number of  other supply side 
initiatives which the state might have implemented, both to raise productivity and to improve 
rural living standards. In fact the state did very little. We shall now look more closely at the 
li\,estock from Cataluila, Pais Valenciano, Murcia, Madrid, Santander, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. All figures are from Simpson,  199~, p.69. 
37  Crafts. 1994, pp.51-2 and, especially, Mol,:yr,  1987, pp.208-12. 
31 Simpson, 1994, cuadro 4. 
}9 These points are considered in more detail in Simpson, 1997, pp.72-9 and  1995, ch.8. 
14 potential for change in the late nineteenth century. 
As production costs continued to rise faster than farm prices. farmers were 
required eYerywhere sooner or later to reduce unit costs. The agricultural experience of four 
countries is summarized in Table 6.  Unit costs were reduced primarily through 
mechanization (United States), by raising yields (Denmark or Italy) or by the shift of 
resources into other, more profitable activities (Britain).~o  Given that natural resource 
endo\\ments in Spain made it very difficult to raise yields, the obvious solution to improving 
labour productivity and raising living standards was by encouraging migration, and 
mechanization. Furthermore, with industrialization, agriculture is destined to decline, and 
economists stress the importance of  a rapid movement of  resources out of agriculture to other, 
more productive sectors, as a source of  productivity growth.41  In this vein, one distinguished 
British agricultural historian has described the period 1870 and 1914 for his country in terms 
of  success, because its contribution to GNP declined from 15 to 6 per cent, and its share of 
the active labour force fell from 16 to 8 per cent: 
"At the least, agriculture as the first of  Britain's major 
industries to go into decline, had coped with its decline with 
more flexibility and less long-term anguish and distress than 
other staple industries, such as coal, cotton or shipbuilding, 
which went down the same road later. At the best, a slimmer 
agriculture, by 1914, really was fitter, economically, than it 
had been in 1870: British consumers enjoyed cheap food, the 
cheapest in Europe, and British farmers and farm workers 
enjoyed higher real incomes".42 
TIris type of  solution would, however, have be rejected by the very great 
.., Clearly, identifying individual countries with each possibility is an oversimplification, if  only because farmers often choose a 
combination of  approaches. It does have the advantage in that it makes clearer the options facing a counlIy  . 
• , To cite just one recent study, Broadberry has suggested that an important factor in the closing of  the aggregate labour productivity gap 
between Britain and Germany was achieved by shifting resources out of  the latter's agriCUlture. Broadberry, 1997. The classic case is 
England during the [ndustrial Revolution. although for a criticism, see A1[en,  [992 . 
• 2  Thompson. 1996. p.59. 
15 majority of Spaniards in 1900. Sanchez Alonso has noted for emigration, opinion in the half 
century prior to the Great War changed only slowly from its outright rejection. to a believe 
that policies should be implemented to retain labour in  agriculture.~3 Very few contemporaries 
saw rural migration and mechanization as a solution to cheap imports. or as a means of 
raising rural incomes.  Instead. most wanted the state to implement policies to increase the 
size of  the rural population.  ~~ 
This association of a prosperous nation with a large agricultural labour force 
was an unfortunate one for Spanish economic deyelopment.  The cheap grain from North 
America was often produced on family farms and under conditions not so different from 
Spain's secano, but with mechanization allowing a much larger area of  cultivation. With 
similar wheat yields to those found in Spain, labour productivity in cereal farming in the 
United States increased four times between 1840 and 1910, and another 70 per cent between 
1910 and 1930.  In Spain, the figure was significantly smaller.
4
;  The potential of  cereal 
mechanization was understood by both Abela and Costa in their debate of  the early 1880s, 
before domestic prices started to fall in Spain.~6 Abela argued that it was necessary to 
abandon cereal cultivation on marginal land and mechanise.  He also recommended a switch 
into more competitive crops \vhen possible. Costa's ideas were not so different, although he 
questioned hO\v Spanish farmers would be able to mechanise given the backward nature of 
the country. Unfortunately, when prices actually fell after 1882, there were few who 
challenged the idea that a prosperous agriculture needed to employ large numbers of  workers, 
even if  mechanization was considered by some as necessary.47 
In fact, population growth in Spain had made land increasingly scarce relative 
to labour, and in the Crisis agricola y oecuaria there are various references to declining yields 
in the interior. The movement from a resource-based agriCUlture to a science-based one on 
Spain's secano was difficult, and labour absorbing policies were unsuitable for late nineteenth 
.3  Sanchez Alonso, 1995, ch.2; for agrarian policies, see especially, Robledo,I993, pp.75-94  . 
.... This can be seen in the replies to question 15 of La crisis asrricola v pecuaria, where very few argued that the agricultural work force 
should be reduced, and most suggested that measures should be taken to increase it. More significantly. of  the 40 Questions relating to 
-cereales y legumbres", none asked how farmers might become more productive or competitive; instead Questions were heavily biased 
towards the possibility of  restricting imports, raising domestic output and increasing internal prices  . 
• 5 Simpson 1995, p.228 . 
.. The debate is resumed in Orti,  1976. GEHR, 1980, pp.l13-22, and Robledo, 1993,77-80. 
47  Abela believed that mechanization would allow an extension in the area of  cultivation. rather than a decline in the rural workforce. 
16 century cereal famling.  Wheat yields remained stagnant until the 1960s (although artificial 
fertilizers would permit an extension in the area cultivated). There were also technical 
difficulties in introducing intensive livestock farming systems in a country \\'hich suffered 
long summer droughts. and international market opportunities for both the \'ine and oli\'e 
were limited. Resources that \\'ere kept in extensi\,e cereals had no ob\'ious alternati\'e use. 
Ho\\'e\'er. it needs to be remembered that these limitations still had to be learnt by 
contemporaries.  Most \\Titers prior to the First World War were unaware of the difficulties in 
raising output per hectare on the secano. whether this was by impro\'ing cereal yields, or 
switching to other, higher value crops. Technical change is always accompanied by many 
failures, and the historian has a major advantage over contemporaries in being able to identify 
better the direction of successful technological change.  Furthermore, for individual farmers, 
there were obvious advantages in having a cheap, plentiful work force which removed the 
necessity to experiment with costly machinery.  Finally, contemporaries in general believed 
that rural unrest was less threatening than the social and political problems associated with 
rapid urbanization and industrialization. 
But once mechanization and a rapid rural exodus are rejected, there were 
relatively few alternatives if  the policy goal was a competitive agricultural sector, at least on 
the secano. Yet it could reasonably be argued that a "competitive" agriculture was not in fact 
a priority for most. Table 7 outlines four possible policy aims which, if  they are over 
simplified, probably include most major ideas being debated in this period.  Three imply an 
increase in the rural population, rather than a decline. 
Not all Spain was secano, and some countries were successful in both 
increasing output per agricultural worker and providing employment for a growing labour 
force.  Furthennore, mechanization occurred slowly in many European countries, and the 
emphasis instead was often on land saving technologies. 48 The classic European case perhaps 
was Denmark, which successfully exploited its comparative advantage, and was at the 
forefront of  technological and institutional change.  If  contemporaries really wished Spain to 
Abela, 1880, p.557, 
48 
Van Zanden, 1991, pp,234, 
17 provide agricultural employment for a growing population, and delay the rural exodus, 
alternatives to the cereals-vines-olives-extensiw livestock production systems needed to be 
found.  However. incentiws to change in these directions were often lacking.  \\'  e shall 
consider three areas where supply side incentives might have induced producti\·ity changes. 
First. and as we have mentioned. a frequent solution to the decline in cereal 
prices else\\·here \\·as for farmers to switch to livestock farming.  The grO\\1h in nominal 
wages oYer the period 1870-1910, the increase in urbanization, and the decline in the real cost 
of  basic foods, and increased demand in western Europe.  Furthermore, whilst the farm gate 
price of meat and dairy produce often increased faster than the general price index, European 
farmers also benefited from a steep decline in feed costs, namely barley, maize and oilseed 
cake.
49  Spanish farmers benefited from demand shifts, although by less.  Urban Spain grew 
slowly from 21.5 per cent of  the total population in 1887 to 23.9 per cent in 1910,  urban 
nominal wages increased by 20 or 30 per cent, and per capita consumption of  wheat increased 
slowly, rather than decline.  50  However, on the supply side, livestock farmers saw no fall in 
nominal feed costs.  Thus, whereas wheat prices stagnated between 1869173 and 1909113 (5 
per cent increase), barley prices rose from 53 per cent of  the wheat price to 75 or 80 per cent. 
and maize from 71  to 75 per cent.
51  Oilseed cake, an important feature of  the "Second 
Agricultural Revolution" was scarcely used because of  tariffs on imported vegetable oils. 
Therefore, one potential area for helping farmers switch out of  low yield cereals to higher 
value livestock was missed.  The steep decline in international feed costs did not benefit the 
Spanish livestock farmers, whether in the urban dairies of  Barcelona or Madrid, the small 
farms of  the North, or the extensive pastures of  the secano. 
A second "missed opportunity" was institutional innovation, especially in the 
area of  cooperatives. The late nineteenth century in many areas of  Europe saw a decline in the 
numbers of  agriculturallaborers, and an increase in the relative importance of  small farmers.
52 
Although small farms proved highly adaptable to changing markets, they were at a 
disadvantage in the few, but growing areas where economies of  scale existed. Cooperatives 
.9 Thompson, 1968 and Van Zanden, 1991, pp. 232. For relative wheat:meat prices in Madrid, See Simpson, 1997, figure 3. 
SA>  Urban Spain was, however, only 14.9 per cent in  1860. Figures refer to municipalities of  over 20,000 inhabitants and provincial capitals. 
Reher, 1989, pp.196. For  wheat per capita consumption, see Torres, 1944, p.24 1. 
SI  Sanchez Albomoz, 1975, p.180; Garcia Lombadero, 1971; Carreras (ed) 1989 and Anuario estadistico, 1917, p.259. GEHR, 1980, give 
a lower figure for barley in the early 1900s, which suggests that the price gap closed quickly from around 1910. 
18 were considered as a potential solution. linking the low monitoring costs of  the small fann. 
with the economies of scale found in a growing number of  areas as agriculture became more 
commercial.  Cooperatives in the late nineteenth century had a number of functions, namely 
buying for members off-farn1 inputs (fertilizers. pesticides. machinery etc). providing a 
cheap. but flexible banking system and. finally. the transforn1ation and commercialization of 
agricultural produce.  As Van Zanden has written: 
"In Scandina\'ia, the Lo\\" Countries, Gern1any, Switzerland. Ireland. and large 
parts of  eastern Europe cooperati\'es fundamentally reorganized rural markets. 
By 1910 in these countries most farmers were members of some kind of 
cooperative. Almost nothing of  this kind occurred in Britain, France, and 
southern Europe. There membership of  cooperatives remained restrictive to a 
small minority offarmers".53 
Why were cooperatives so weak in southern Europe, and in particular, in 
Spain?  Once again, a demand explanation has some relevance. One argument is that the slow 
process of  technological change and low level of  commercialization in Spanish agriculture, 
implied that the demand for the economic services that cooperatives might supply was 
limited, especially prior to the First World War. For example, although commercial fertilizers 
were still relatively unimportant, they accounted for two third's of  cooperative purchases in 
1920.54 However, there was a widespread demand for rural credit, and cooperatives might 
have allowed farmers to enjoy a greater share of  the value added in the transformation and 
marketing of  their products.  Here cooperatives appear to have failed prior to 1910 for one of 
two reasons. In the fIrst instance there were high transaction costs for farmers in setting up 
cooperatives, and there was no national body willing to create the incentives required for such 
a far reaching economic reform. Thus although the catholic church, as elsewhere, successfully 
recruited hundreds of  thousands of  farmers in the inter-war period, its mission was spiritual 
rather than one of  economic development.  Second, the formation of  cooperatives, at least 
initially, was easier in those countries, such as Canada, where farmers could exert political 
S2 See, for example,  Van Zanden,  1991, p.216, Koning, 1994 and Guinnane, 1997, p.41-7. 
Sl Van Zanden, 1991, p.237. 
S4  Garrido, 1995, p.13I; for the low level of  fertilizer usage in agriculture, see Simpson. 1995, chapter 5, and  Pujol, 1998. 
19 influence.  Cooperative members were able to vote for those representatives who were willing 
to back initiatives on their behalf.  Later, from the mid 1930s especially, governments would 
themselyes encourage the formation of cooperatives as a system which could help to control 
the growing surpluses brought about by excessiye production. 
A third area where a state committed to the dewlopment of a large and 
prosperous agriculture might haye acted was in the area of lease and land refom1.  Most 
commentators criticized the short term nature of leases, the failure to compensate tenants for 
improyements made, the foros and rabassa morta, and the large areas of supposedly 
underutilized land found on the latifundios, etc. Similar problems were widely debated in 
other European countries at the time, and in less developed countries today.  Opinion has 
shifted considerably over the last century on the economic and social implications of such 
reforms, and today it seems unlikely that tenure or land reform would have increased labour 
productivity significantly in the long run.
55  However, reform might have delayed the rural 
exodus, one of  the supposed aims of  government policy.  As with the development of 
cooperatives - which might have had a positive role on growth if  they improved market 
efficiency - the failure to implement an agrarian reform reflects the low' priority that the state 
gave to family farming. 
In conclusion, the state was much more successful in the period 1880-1910 in 
the area of  economic regulation, than in the provision of  public goods to make agriculture 
more competitive.  As elsewhere, the state was required to respond to the appearance of 
disease, especially phylloxera, and problems of  public health related to food quality.  By 
contrast it played only a minor role in reducing transaction costs in the development of 
cooperatives, it was slow to carry out investment in infrastructure, create agricultural 
experimental stations and extension services (and fund them adequately), to develop a proper 
statistical service, to produce a cadastre, etc.  Spanish farmers were not alone in having to 
operate with a weak state.  In England, the state did even less for farmers.  But in England, as 
we have seen, agriculture was treated as a declining industry.  In Spain, government talked of 
the need for a prosperous, family-based, agriculture. Given this, and the fact that tariffs and 
taxes (consumos) in general restricted the incentives to move out of  traditional crops, then a 
ss This is treated in greater detail in Carrnona and Simpson, forthcoming. 
20 more dynamic state \\'as required to create alternative incentiYes for change. 
conclusion. 
Although falling prices in the late nineteenth century led to significant changes in the 
agriculture of  many European countries. changes in Spain appear much fe\\'er.  Furthern1ore. 
the period 1880-1910 \\'as one of small. or eYen stagnant productivity gro\\1h in Spanish 
agriculture. Increased tariffs delayed the need to move resources out of the sector. and hence 
encourage farmers not to change. This need not have mattered if tariffs had been 
accompanied by incentiYes on the supply side for farmers to increase productivity.  As I have 
argued, this was not forthcoming, at least prior to the First World War. Animal feed costs 
remained high, cooperatives were insignificant, and government funding of  research and 
extension services remained very small. On the demand side, structural change had hardly 
started, and urbanisation increased little faster than the general population growth. Therefore 
market incentives for farmers to switch out of  traditional crops and towards other, higher 
valued produce, was again limited. 
In Spain the "crisis agraria" therefore appears less a problem of  falling prices and 
farmers trying to adapt to more competitive markets, than the generally successful attempts in 
maintaining the area under traditional crops, and limiting the need for technological change. 
The interwar period \vould, by contrast, see a rapid outflo\v of labour to the cities, and \vith it, 
demand for more diversified diets. These changes in turn provided incentives to both increase 
the speed of  technological change on the secano, and increase the output of  irrigation grown 
crops. The state also slowly increased the incentives for change. Labour productivity 
increased by around two thirds, and the labour productivity gap between Spain and northern 
European countries was reduced slightly.56 
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International Wheat Prices 
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Fuentes: 
Espana: Sanchez-Albomoz, 1975, p.180 Y GEHR, 1980, p.l97. 
Francia: Ministere du Travail,  1933,  pp.62-3. 
Inglaterra: GEHR, 1980, p.96. 
ltalia: ISTAT, 1958, p.173. Table 1. 
Wheat prices and replies to "La crisis agricola". 
187~/84  1885/95  % fall  in  % national  % replies 
pesetaslhl  pesetaslhl  pnces  harvest  to 
1890/4  commlSSIO 
n (l) 
Alto Ebro  20,85  18,46  -11.5  5,2  9,2 
Andalucia  24,58  20,70  -15,8  10,6  10,2 
Occidental 
Andalucia  24,67  20,74  -15,9  7,5  4,2 
Oriental 
Aragon  21,47  18,56  -13,5  13,0  11,8 
Cantabria  24,18  21,51  -11,0  1,3  7,6 
Castilla la  21,33  18,92  -11,3  11,6  17,2 
Nueva 
Catalufia  24,66  20,51  -16,8  6,3  6,2 
Castilla la  19,17  17,44  - 9,0  27,1  21,8 
Vieja-Leon 
Extrema- 20,92  18,60  - 11,1  5,4  1,8 
dura 
Galicia  25,08  20,97  -16,4  2,6  5,6 
Murcia  24,60  20,84  -15,3  2,6  1,6 
Valencia  24,91  22,08  -11,4  6,8  2,8 
& 
Baleares 
Espafia  22,70  19,78  -12,9  100,0  100,0 
Source:  columns 1-3, GEHR, 1980, cuadro 4. 
: column 4, Sanz, 1985, cuadro 17 and Arrazola, 1896, pp. 50-1. 

























Notes:  (1) only those replies that can be allocated to regions have been included (500 out of 
the total 517). 
(2) I include only those replies which deal specifically with agriculture (463 out of  the 
total 500). Table 2 
\Vages, agricultural rents and GDP per capita in Europe, 1870-1910. 
Real \\"age  Wage-rental  Real GDP per 
gro\\1h per  ratio  capita 
urban worker  1870-1910  1870-1913 
1870-1913 
Spain  0.44  -0.43  1.11 
Denmark  2.63  2.85  1.57 
France  0.91  1.80  1.30 
Germany  1.02  0.87  1.63 
Great Britian  1.03  2.54  1.01 
Ireland  1.79  4.39  na 
Italy  1.74  na  1.28 
Netherlands  0.64  na  1.01 
Norway  2.43  na  1.31 
Portugal  0.37  na  0.69 
Sweden  2.73  2.45  1.46 
Europe  1.39  2.07  1.25 
New World  1.14  -3.03  1.66 
Sources:  O'Rouke and Williamson, 1997, Table 2. Table 3 
Migration and employment in European agriculture  .. 
Persons  Persons  Date when  % in agriculture 
adjusted net  adjusted  absolute decline  \\'hen absolute 
migration rate  cumulatiye  in the labour  numbers begin 
1870-1910  population  force began  to decline 
(per 1000)  impact 
1910(%) 
Spain  - 1.16  - 5  1950  48.4 
Denmark  - 2.78  -11  1930  35.6 
France  - 0.10  0  1921  41.5 
Gennany  - 0.73 
..,  1907  36.8  - .) 
Great Britian  - 2.25  -9  1851  21.9 
Ireland  -11.24  -36 
Italy  - 9.25  -31  1936  48.2 
Netherlands  - 0.59  - 2  1947  19.3 
Norway  - 5.25  -19  1931  35.3 
Portugal  - 1.06  - 4  1950  48.4 
Sweden  - 4.20  -1:- 1920  40.2 
Europe  - 3.08  -11  1.66 
Sources:  Net migration rate and curnmulative impact, Taylor and Williamson, 1997, Table 1; 
agricultural labour force, Grigg, 1982,  Table 11. Table 4. 
Castilla-Ia-Vieja and Leon in  the national wheat market. 
Wheat  Supply of  % of  Size of 
harvest  wheat to  harvest  national 
other  supplied to  wheat 
regIOns  other  imports 
regIOns 
1890  5324  2700  50,7  1978 
1891  5309  3410  64,2  1611 
1892  5190  3160  60,9  1461 
1893  7749  2414  31,2  4290 
1894  7852  2441  31,1  4366 
1890-4  6285  2825  44,9  2741 
All figures III OOOs QM; wheat pnce pesetaslhl. 
Source: Sanz, 1985, cuadros 6,  19, and 21. 
Table 5 
a. area of  wheat in hectares 
France  Italy  Gr.Britain  USA 
1869173  6829  4737  1445  9081 
1909113  6539  4744  746  19382 
1925129  5358  4870  626  23578 
b. wheat yields 
France  Italy  Gr.Britain  USA 
1869173  1.05  0.84  Na  0.84 
1909/13  1.32  1.02  2.18  0.96 
1925/29  1.48  1.23  2.28  0.95 
Sources: Mitchell, 1992 and 1993. 
Wheat price  Wheat price 
in Castilla- III 
la-Vieja &  Barcelona 
Lean 
17,3  19,8 
19,0  21,7 
19,6  23,0 
17,9  21,7 
15,4  18,6 








0.92 Table 6. 
Agrarian change in four countries, 1880-1913. 
United States  Denmark 
Change in output:  +64%  Change in output:  +71% 
Change in labour:  +30%  Change in labour:  +8% 
Change in area of arable:  +90%  Change in land area:  + 1% 
United Kingdom  Spain 
Change in output:  - 5%  Change in output:  +18% 
Change in labour:  -14%  Change in labour:  +14% 
Change in area of  arable:  -20%  Change in area of  arable:  +10%? 
Labour m all cases refers to males only. 
Sources: 
to arable. 
United States, 1880-1910; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, p.480. Land area refers 
United Kingdom, 1878-1913; Feinstein, 1972, Tables 118 and 13l. Area 
refers to cereals and potatoes only, calculated from Mitchell, 1975. 
Denmark, 1880-1910; Wade, 1981,  p.30l. Land area is total. 
Spain,  output 1879/81  and 1909111  Prados de la Escosura, 1995,  p.85; 
labour, 1877 and 1910, Carreras (ed), 1989; area, see text. Table 7 
Possible policy options in response to falling international food prices. 
Policy goal  Method  Level of  acceptability 
l.  Economic gro\\1h  Free trade; state  Low 
active in research and 
development 
2.  Rent seeking  Tariffs  High (among 
(self-sufficiency in  farmers); low (urban 
wheat)  consumers). 
3.  Urban social peace  Tariffs - to maintain  High 
labour in countryside 
4.  Increase rural  Tariffs; state active in  High 
population  research and 
development Bibliography. 
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